This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim prizes, which are paid while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that an interim-prize contest where (i) a constant interim prize is paid in each period while the contest is ongoing, (ii) if the contest is stopped, a final prize is paid, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. When the principal is constrained by an exogenous deadline, a generalized interim-prize contest, where the interim prize and the number of agents change over time, is optimal.
Introduction
Research contests have a long history as mechanisms for inducing innovation. From navigation and food preservation to aviation, research contests have been used to find solutions to some of society's most pressing problems. 1 Recently, the use of research contests by both the private and public sector has been expanding rapidly. Some examples of problems to which research contests have been applied include vaccine technology, antibiotics overuse, space flight, robotics and AI, as well as environment and energy efficiency. 2 Given that the 2010 America Competes Reauthorization Act authorized US Federal agencies to use prizes and contests, it can be expected that the importance of research contests will only grow in the coming years.
Generally, dynamic research contests are classified into fixed-prize contests and innovation races. 3 To win a fixed-prize contest, an agent needs to have the best innovation by the end of the contest, whereas an agent needs to have a specific innovation as quickly as possible to win an innovation race. Thus, for an innovation race to be feasible, verifiability is necessary in order to determine whether some proposed innovation is indeed the innovation required to win the race. When innovation races are implemented in practice, a verifiable proxy is commonly used to determine whether an innovation meets the principal's requirements. In the case of the 1996 Ansari X Prize, the objectively verifiable proxy was to have two manned space flights in two weeks using the same spacecraft. The larger objective of the organizer, however, was to "incentivize the creation of a safe, reliable, reusable, privately-financed manned space ship to demonstrate that private space travel is commercially viable". 4 The advantage of a race is that it proceeds until an appropriate innovation has been developed (reducing the risk of ending the contest prematurely) and that it minimizes the wasteful duplication (since the contest is stopped as soon as the criteria for awarding the prize have been met). However, the need to use a proxy for quality may result in innovations which are not useful to the sponsor. The 2006 Netflix Prize contest, aimed at improving algorithms for making movie recommendations to their users, featured a $1,000,000 Grand Prize which was to be awarded to the first contestant who would improve upon Netflix's own algorithm by at least 10%. The winning algorithm, however, was never employed because the "the additional accuracy gains [...] did not seem to justify the engineering effort needed to bring them into a production environment." 5 Thus, having to rely on a proxy meant that Netflix awarded the prize for an innovation that was never even used.
When implementing a fixed-prize contest, the principal in general does not have to use a proxy and can instead evaluate the quality of the innovation herself. However, other problems arise, as a fixed-prize contest requires a finite deadline, at which submissions will be evaluated. If the agents are not given enough time, they may fail to produce a good enough innovation. 6 If the deadline is very late, the implementation of the innovation will be delayed and, in addition, there is a risk of wasteful duplication, as agents invest resources while an adequate innovation has already been developed.
This paper deals with the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We identify a novel design lever that the contest designer can use in order to increase efficiency of the contest -paying interim prizes while the contest is ongoing. The optimal contest takes a simple form. The principal decides in each period whether to stop the contest or not. If the contest is not stopped, the principal has to pay out an interim prize, the value of which was announced before the contest started. If the contest is stopped, the principal has to pay out the final prize, the value of which was also announced in advance. We call this type of contest an interim-prize contest. An interim-prize contest offers a solution to the trade-off between innovation races and fixed-prize contests. It induces an equilibrium where all agents conduct research until they achieve an innovation quality (which does not have to be verifiable) set out by the principal. The agent that discovers such innovation immediately reveals it to the principal who in turn stops the contest. An interim-prize contest thus combines the best of the two formats -it inherits the race-like structure, thereby eliminating wasteful duplication and the risk of a premature ending, without requiring a verifiable proxy for quality.
Our setting closely follows the seminal work by Taylor (1995) . There is a principal who would like to procure an innovation and multiple agents who can choose to conduct research in each period. Research is costly and yields an innovation whose value is a random draw from some distribution. The research decisions and the values of innovations are private information to the agents. If an agent reveals the innovation to the principal, the principal can costlessly and accurately determine its value. However, the value is not verifiable by outside parties. In particular, a contract which conditions on the innovation value is not enforceable by courts. 7 In order to incentivize the agents to conduct research, the principal announces a contest. Taylor (1995) studies what we call a fixed-prize contest, in which the principal commits to paying a prize p at the end of an exogenously given deadline of T periods. 8 In an interim-prize contest, the principal commits to both the final prize p (which is paid out once the contest ends), and to the interim prize m (which is paid out in each period as long as the contest continues). We endogenize the deadline T , which becomes a design choice of the principal and allow for an infinite horizon. Furthermore, the principal can end the contest before the deadline is reached, in which case the final prize p is paid out. Like in Taylor (1995) , the principal determines the number of agents n which are invited to the contest and sets the entry fee or entry subsidy E which agents need to pay in order to participate in the contest. Agents participate in the contest if their expected payoff is at least zero.
Our first main result shows that we can implement any innovation value as the threshold of a global stopping equilibrium with any n agents using an appropriate interim-prize contest. In a global stopping equilibrium, all n agents conduct research in every period until some agent discovers an innovation with a value above the threshold and then the research effort is stopped by all agents. This result is in sharp contrast to the finding in Taylor (1995) , who shows that a fixed-prize contest implements only individual stopping equilibria. With an individual stopping equilibrium, each of the n agents conducts research in every period until she herself discovers an innovation with a value above the threshold, irrespective of what the other agents find. Our result is remarkable for three reasons. First, it eliminates the wasteful duplication of research effort which results with individual stopping equilibria. Second, it eliminates the possibility that the contest will end before an appropriate innovation has been found. Third, the innovation is made available to the principal as soon as it is discovered.
There is a clear economic interpretation underlying our implementation result. On the one hand, the final prize takes care of the agents' incentives. Namely, it induces them to conduct research in every period in order to obtain an innovation of value above the threshold and win the final prize. The presence of the interim prize complicates matters, because an agent with a value above the threshold may wish to delay the submission in the hope of winning the interim prize in this period and then the final prize in the next period. Such a delay is risky, though, as another agent may also obtain an innovation above the threshold and end the contest. A sufficiently high final prize ensures that delaying is not profitable and induces truthful reporting of research outcomes in addition to research effort in all periods. 9 On the other hand, the interim prize takes care of 8 The principal only needs to commit to pay out the final prize to one of the agents. Once that commitment is made, the promise to award the prize to the agent with the best innovation is credible. 9 The danger of delaying submission is relevant in the real-world too. In the Netflix Prize contests, the second-placed team had the same performance measure as the winners. They lost because they submitted their bid 20 minutes after the eventual winners. See "A $1 Million Research Bargain for Netflix, and Maybe a Model for Others" in The New York Times. https://nyti.ms/2InaHqN. the principal's incentives. In a fixed-prize contest, the principal has no incentive to stop the contest once a value above the threshold has been submitted, because she does not bear the marginal cost of research, but stands to gain by obtaining an even higher value in the next period. The interim prize is set such that it equals the marginal benefit of continuing the contest for one more period when the threshold value has been obtained. Thus, the marginal cost of continuing the contest for one more period, i.e., the interim prize, equals the marginal benefit of continuing the contest for one more period exactly at the threshold. Consequently, the principal wants to stop the contest if and only if a value above the threshold is obtained, thereby giving rise to a global stopping equilibrium.
While the ability to implement global stopping equilibria using interim-prize contests is of interest in itself, it does not answer the question of whether the principal would actually want to do so. Indeed, one can show that for a given threshold value and number of agents, a global stopping equilibrium has lower expected research costs than an individual stopping equilibrium, but that the latter has a higher expected value of innovation than the former. Hence, it is a priori unclear which contest maximizes the principal's utility. Moreover, it is not clear if some other contest, or some other mechanism performs better than either an interim-prize or a fixed-prize contest. Our second main result addresses this issue by showing that the principal can implement the first-best outcome with an appropriate interim-prize contest. Then, the principal can extract the entire surplus with appropriate entry fees. Thus, interim-prize contests constitute the optimal mechanism more generally.
Our optimality result relies on the assumption that that the principal can charge entry fees. The ability of the principal to charge entry fees is common in the literature. For example, Taylor (1995) makes this assumption. The ability to charge entry fees is also central in papers on auctioning entry into contests, for example in Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Giebe (2014) . It was also used in practice. Taylor (1995) mentions the $200,000 entry fee into the FCC's contest aimed to develop the HD TV standard. Finally, even if the principal could not charge entry fees, our results would still imply that an interim-prize contest is a welfare-maximizing mechanism. Since many of the research contests are funded by public or donor money and are not motivated by profits (such as the 2012 EU Vaccine Prize, the 2015 Better Use of Antibiotics Prize and the 2015 NRG Cosia Carbon XPrize, to name a few), insights from this paper could be useful even in those cases where the principal cannot charge entry fees.
In the main model, we assume that the principal can choose an infinite deadline for the contest. In an extension, we consider the case where there is an exogenous finite deadline beyond which the contest cannot run or the innovation becomes worthless. With a finite deadline the first-best outcome does not have a structure as simple as with an infinite deadline. Gal, Landsberger, and Levykson (1981) and Morgan (1983) have shown that while a global stopping equilibrium is still optimal, the first-best search intensity can generally change non-monotonically over time. Without additional assumptions on the research process it is impossible to say more about the optimum. We thus impose a breakthrough innovation structure, which means that we assume that there are essentially two types of innovations -breakthroughs and low-value innovations. This structure represents a reasonable description for many research contests, as an innovation will often have some dimensions which are key to the principal and make it a breakthrough, while other dimensions affect the value of the innovation in only a negligible fashion. Under the assumption of a breakthrough innovations structure, the first-best search rule is a global stopping equilibrium where the number of participants in the contest increases as the deadline draws near. Importantly, the optimal number of contestants can be fixed ex ante. We generalize the notion of the interim-prize contest to allow for an increasing number of contestants over time and show that this generalized interim-prize contest is an optimal mechanism and implements the first best.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2. We study the infinite horizon case in Section 3, while the finite horizon case is considered in Section 4. Related literature is presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. The precise formulation of the dynamic game induced by an interim-prize contest is in Appendix A. All proofs are in Appendix B.
Model

Setting
There is a risk-neutral principal who wants to procure an innovation and a set of identical risk-neutral agents N = N who can potentially discover the innovation by conducting research. If the principal obtains the innovation in any period s ∈ {1, . . . ,
where θ is the value of the innovation and w t = i w ti is the sum of transfers made to all agents in period t. Agent i's payoff is T t=1 δ t−1 (w ti − c ti ), where w ti is the transfers received and c ti is the cost incurred through research activities in period t. We assume that the innovations are of no intrinsic value to the agents and allow for any discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1].
An agent can conduct research in any period t at per-period cost C > 0. In each period in which the agent performs research he obtains an innovation of value θ ∈ Θ. The innovation value obtained is an independent draw from some distribution F with full and finite support Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ K }. Without loss, assume that θ k+1 > θ k and let θ 1 = 0. We interpret the outcome θ 1 = 0 as a failure to develop an innovation which is more valuable than the current technological level. Agents can repeatedly conduct research and have perfect recall, that is, they can access all their own previously obtained innovations at any point in time. Initially, every agent is endowed with a worthless innovation and in each period in which an agent does not conduct research he receives a worthless innovation (i.e. a shirking agent does not advance beyond the current technological level).
The agents' research activity (whether or not they conduct research in any given period) and research outcomes (the value of an innovation obtained in any given period) are private information. If an agent submits an innovation to the principal, the principal can determine the value of the innovation at no cost. However, the value of an innovation is not verifiable by a court. Thus, contracts conditioning on the value of innovation are not credible. 10 The agents are not budget constrained. This has two implications. The agents can always afford to conduct research and the principal can charge positive entry fees. The outside option of the agents is normalized to zero. Taylor (1995) considers what we will refer to as a fixed-prize contest (FPC). An FPC is a tuple Γ = E, p, n, T , where E ∈ R is an entry fee, n ∈ N is the (invited) number of participating agents, T ∈ N is the finite contest deadline and p ∈ R is the final prize, which is awarded to an agent at the end of T periods. In contrast, we introduce an interim-prize contest (IPC) as a tuple Γ = E, p, m, n, T . An IPC differs from an FPC in the two ways. First, there could also be an "infinite" deadline T = ∞, which means that there is no deadline and the contest can run for as long as the principal wants it to. Second, there is an interim prize m ∈ R which the principal has to pay to some agent after every period until the contest stops. However, note that an FPC is a special case of an IPC, where m = 0 and T is finite. The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the timing of an IPC. 11 In order for an IPC to be credible, courts need to be able to verify (i) that the interim prize was paid in every period but the last, and (ii) that the final prize was awarded, which can happen no later than at the deadline T . Thus, courts only need to be able to verify time-contingent payments. We view this assumption as uncontroversial, as such contracts are common. For example, utility bills come with payment deadlines and penalties for late payment.
Contests
An IPC induces a T -period dynamic game of incomplete information. 12 Note that the principal not only announces the contest, but once the contest has started, she is herself 10 Non-observability and non-verifiability is a typical feature of research activity. As Taylor (1995, p. 873) notes "research inputs are notoriously difficult to monitor" and "courts seldom possess the ability or expertise necessary to evaluate technical research projects".
11 Of course, one can imagine different contest formats, for example with multiple prizes or with timecontingent interim prize m t . As it turns out, the optimum can be achieved with a simple IPC.
12 For a detailed description of the game, see Appendix A.
Period 0
Principal commits to a contest, agents pay the entry fee.
Period 1 The contest begins.
· · ·
In any period t: (i) the agents decide whether to conduct research; (ii) the agents privately learn the value of innovation and decide whether to submit it and (iii) the principal observes the submitted values and decides whether to continue the contest.
If the contest continues, the interim prize m is paid. If the contest stops, the final prize p is paid.
The contest ends for sure and the final prize p is paid. 3 Infinite Horizon
Implementation of Global Stopping Equilibria
Stopping behavior provides an easy and intuitive way to describe the agents' equilibrium play in the contest in terms of their research activity. Under an individual stopping equilibrium, every agent does research in every period of the contest until an individual threshold value of innovation is reached, irrespective of the innovations discovered by other agents. Such an individual stopping equilibrium consequently entails a risk of duplication of research effort across agents. In contrast, such wasteful duplication of research effort is avoided under a global stopping equilibrium, where every agent does research in every period of the contest until a single agent reaches some global threshold at which point all agents stop doing research. An FPC uniquely implements individual stopping equilibria, as the chance of winning the final prize provides the agents with an incentive to conduct research until a threshold is reached (Taylor, 1995) . However, an FPC cannot implement a global stopping equilibrium because the principal cannot credibly commit to stop the contest after the threshold value has been achieved. The reason is that she does not bear the marginal cost of continued research, while she stands to benefit from any marginal increase in the value of innovation. Our first result shows that an appropriately designed IPC can implement any value of innovation as the threshold of a global stopping equilibrium, thereby eliminating the risk of wasteful duplication of research effort present in an FPC.
Proposition 1 Any value θ g can be implemented as the threshold of a global stopping equilibrium with at least two agents and for any T ≤ ∞ by using an IPC with sufficiently high final prize p and the interim prize
(1)
The proposition shows that for any θ g ∈ Θ, there exists an IPC such that in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium n agents enter the contest, each agent performs research until she obtains an innovation of value θ g , and, once this occurs, the agent reports the discovered innovation to the principal. The principal immediately stops the contest and thus any further research effort, declares a winner and awards the final prize. 13 Moreover, as long as the deadline is not reached and the principal does not end the contest, the principal randomly chooses an agent to whom the interim prize m is awarded. 14 In order to implement a global stopping equilibrium, the agents need to conduct research until the threshold is reached and then to immediately report their innovation to the principal. The principal needs to stop the contest once this happens. The final prize and the interim prizes are the instruments which ensure this behavior, respectively.
The interim prize in equation (1) corresponds exactly to the principal's marginal benefit of continuing the contest one more period when an innovation of value θ g has been submitted. Thus, through the interim prize, the principal incurs a constant marginal cost of one more round of research by the agents. Since the marginal benefit of research to the principal is decreasing in θ, the principal strictly prefers to continue the contest whenever the highest innovation value is below θ g , strictly prefers to stop it whenever it is above, and is indifferent exactly at the threshold value. As a consequence, the principal will credibly stop the contest if and only if at least the threshold value θ g was reached, as this value of innovation equalizes the marginal cost and benefit of research to the principal.
Conversely, the final prize gives the incentives to the agents to perform research in every period and to report their research outcomes truthfully. Intuitively, as in the FPC, each agent pursues an individual stopping threshold which is determined by the expected probability of winning the final prize. Increasing the final prize increases the individual stopping threshold. If the individual stopping threshold is above the global stopping threshold, the agents will conduct research as long as the contest is ongoing. Similarly, the final prize induces the agents to truthfully report their research outcomes. By not reporting an innovation above the threshold, an agent could win the interim prize in the current period in addition to the final prize in the next period. However, not reporting exposes the agent to the risk that another agent will win in the current period and end the contest. As long as the size of the final prize is sufficiently large relative to the interim prize, the agent will report truthfully. Thus, incentives of the agents can be satisfied by making the final prize large enough. Since the interim prize is a function of the final prize, the incentives of both the principal and the agents can be satisfied simultaneously, such that the equilibrium exhibits global stopping. The final prize p and the interim prizes m are set high enough so that the agents' participation constraints are satisfied and n agents want to enter the contest.
The above intuition also serves as a sketch of the proof. The first step is to show that the principal does not want to deviate from the equilibrium strategy given the interim prize, while the second step is to show that for a sufficiently high final prize the agents do not want to deviate either.
We want to emphasize that the implementation result in Proposition 1 does not rely on any assumptions about the research process and lengths of deadlines. It can also be extended to the case of continuous distributions of innovation. However, as is typical in contests, there need to be at least two agents participating in the contest to induce any incentives to exert effort.
Optimal Contests
Our first main result above shows that it is possible to implement global stopping equilibria without relying on verifiability of research outcomes. While this is of interest in itself, the fact that the principal can implement a global stopping equilibrium in principle does not imply that she actually wants to do so. One may suspect that a global stopping equilibrium is preferable to an individual stopping equilibrium, but this need not be true in general. Indeed, comparing an FPC and an IPC with the same threshold value and number of contestants, one can show that the individual stopping equilibrium yields a higher expected value of innovation than the global stopping equilibrium. It is thus not obvious whether the IPC or the FPC perform better. Moreover, it is not clear if there exists some other contest, or indeed some other mechanism, which performs better than either the IPC or the FPC. To shed light on this, we turn to the question of optimality in this section.
In the absence of informational barriers, our framework corresponds to classic search problems (Gal et al., 1981; Morgan, 1983) . In these models, the searcher can draw multiple samples from the distribution of values in each period and, taking into account the best value she already has, decide whether to continue the search or not. In the search problem corresponding to the present framework with infinite horizon, Benkert, Letina, and Nöldeke (2018) show that the searcher optimally searches with a constant sample size n F B across time until some threshold θ F B has been reached. 15 Put differently, a global stopping equilibrium with constant search intensity is an optimal search strategy. This leads to our second result.
Proposition 2 If n F B ≥ 2 the first-best outcome can be implemented using an IPC.
The result follows in three steps. First, by Proposition 1 in Benkert et al. (2018) , the first-best is equivalent to a global stopping equilibrium with (i) θ F B threshold, (ii) infinite horizon, and (iii) n F B agents. Second, by Proposition 1 such an outcome can be implemented by an interim-prize contest. Third, choosing the entry fee E such that the agents' participation constraint is binding allows the principal to fully extract the first-best surplus. Thus, the IPC not only outperforms the FPC, rather, it is the optimal mechanism more generally. 16 We noted in the previous section that we need at least two agents participating in the contest to induce any effort. As a consequence, we can implement the first best using an IPC only when n F B ≥ 2. However, a slight twist to the IPC allows us to implement the first-best outcome when n F B = 1, too. More precisely, to implement a global stopping equilibrium with only one agent doing research, the principal announces an IPC between a "real agent" and a "fictitious agent". The interim prizes are always paid to the fictitious agent. However, only the real agent can receive the final prize, which occurs only in the case he submits an innovation value above the threshold. This way the interim prize still ensures that the principal will adhere to the global stopping equilibrium, the agent will exert effort in every period in order to obtain the final prize by reaching at least the threshold value, and the fictitious agent has no incentive to exert any research effort. Taylor (1995) notes that the first best could be achieved if the principal, instead of holding one multi-period contest, held a series of one-period contests. However, if inspecting the agents' submissions is costly, running a sequence of one-period contests and inspecting submissions after every period may be prohibitively costly. This points to another advantage of the IPC. Namely, the principal only has to inspect submissions once and only from the agents who have developed an innovation of high enough quality.
Finite Horizon
In the previous section we established that the optimum can be implemented with an IPC when the principal can choose an infinite deadline. In this section we study the case with an exogenously given finite deadline T by which the innovation must be developed.
As noted above, the first-best outcome takes a particularly simple form in the case of an infinite deadline. With a finite deadline, however, the first-best solution is more complicated. In general, the first best is characterized by a function n F B (θ, t), which specifies the number of agents which optimally do research in period t when the current highest value is θ. Gal et al. (1981) and Morgan (1983) have shown that there exists a global stopping value θ g such that n F B (θ, t) = 0 for θ ≥ θ g and that the number n F B (θ, t) is decreasing in θ and increasing in t. Thus, there is a global stopping threshold even with a finite horizon, but the optimal number of agents doing research will generally change non-monotonically over time. 17 Without additional assumptions on the distribution of innovation qualities it is impossible to say more about the first-best research process. To make progress we thus assume that innovations are either breakthroughs or they are not. The assumption captures the idea that when a principal wants to procure an innovation, there are some key characteristics which largely determine the value of an innovation, while other factors may influence the value but not in a substantial way. For instance, in the Ansari X Prize mentioned in the introduction, the sponsors stated that the goal of the contest was "build[ing] and launch[ing] a spacecraft capable of carrying three people to 100 kilometers above the Earth's surface, twice within two weeks". While a spacecraft that met this goal could be better or worse, the difference to the organizer did probably not matter as much as achieving that publicly stated goal. Thus, we believe that a breakthrough innovation structure is a good approximation for many research contests. Formally, the assumption takes the following form.
17 Given the finite time horizon there is the basic trade-off between increasing the chance of getting a high value of innovation by having many agents do research in a given period and risking wasteful duplication. As the deadline approaches the principal becomes more willing to risk duplication for a given value as there are less research opportunities in the future. Having a relatively high value of innovation early on reduces the pressure to get a better innovation in the future and the principal is therefore less willing to risk duplication by having many agents do research simultaneously.
Assumption 1 The set of values of innovation is given by
Given this assumption, the first best takes a fairly simple form. Once a breakthrough has been achieved, further research is not worthwhile and the principal stops any additional research effort. As long as no breakthrough has been achieved, however, the principal will weakly increase the research effort in every period, as the deadline draws nearer.
Lemma 1 Given Assumption 1, n F B (0, t) ≤ n F B (0, t + 1) and n F B (θ, t) = 0 for all
Thus, given a breakthrough innovation structure, the first best is a global stopping equilibrium in which research effort is increasing until a breakthrough is obtained. In particular, the principal might not stop the contest until the end of the finite horizon. This is in contrast to the optimal deadline in a FPC. It is not difficult (we do so in Appendix C) to construct examples of FPCs where extending the deadline decreases the principal's payoff, even when there is no discounting. Thus, a principal who is restricted to hold a fixed-prize contest, would set a deadline which is too short from the social perspective.
The IPC contest we introduced above cannot implement the first best, because the number of participants in an IPC is constant over time. However, we can easily generalize the notion of an IPC to accommodate the increasing number of researchers over time. Let a generalized interim-prize contest (gIPC) be a tuple Γ = E, p, m, n, T , where n = [n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n T ] is a vector specifying the number of participants in each period, E = [E 1 , . . . , E T ] is the vector of entry fees to be paid by participants entering in period t, and m = [m 1 , . . . , m T −1 ] is the vector of interim prizes, where prize m t is paid in period t if the contest continues to the next period.
The game induced by a gIPC is analogous to the one induced by a regular IPC, but with two differences. First, in any period t with n t > n t−1 , n t − n t−1 additional agents are randomly chosen from the set N and invited to participate in the contest and to pay the entry fee E t . Second, the interim prize is not the same in each period, but can vary from period to period. However, the principal commits to the entire sequence E, m and n before the contest begins. Independent of Assumption 1, a gIPC can implement a global stopping equilibrium with an ex ante fixed sequence of participants in the contest. Together with Assumption 1, a gIPC implements the first-best outcome for the principal.
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1 and a finite deadline T , the first-best outcome can be implemented using a generalized IPC with sufficiently high p and a sequence of interim prizes
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The proof of this result closely follows that of Proposition 1 and the intuition is unchanged, that is, the interim prizes ensure the principal's adherence to the global stopping equilibrium and the final prize ensures the agents' willingness to conduct research until they achieve a breakthrough which is reported immediately. The difference is that in a gIPC, the principal's marginal benefit of one additional round of research is not constant. Rather, it depends on the time period t, since in the next period additional participants might enter the contest, changing the expected value of research and bringing additional entry fees. However, the sequence of interim prizes can be adjusted appropriately, so that the principal is still indifferent between continuing and stopping the contest at exactly the threshold value θ b . Finally, the principal will always set as late a deadline as possible, thereby avoiding a premature end to the contest.
The optimal number of participants is increasing over time, because of the danger that the finite deadline will arrive and that the breakthrough innovation will not be discovered. However, most innovation contests without free entry do not feature an increasing number of participants. Instead, they often feature a decreasing number of participants, as some are eliminated over time. For example, the 2015 NRG Cosia Carbon XPRIZE contest featured three rounds, with participants eliminated at the end of each round. We conjecture that the reason for this discrepancy is that in our model, the value that an agent will have at the end of each period is independent of the values held in the previous period. That is, research is modeled as an independent draw in each period. In reality, research is often cumulative, so that an agent who lags behind others has a lower chance of eventually winning the contest. In such a situation, it may be efficient to eliminate laggards over time. How to design a research contest when innovation is cumulative is an exciting area for future research.
Related Literature
The seminal paper on dynamic research contests is Taylor (1995) on which we build our model. 18 He shows that a T -period FPC with N agents uniquely implements an individual stopping equilibrium among the agents. Further, Taylor shows that it is optimal to limit the number of agents in the contest and that the principal can extract the entire ex ante surplus using appropriate entry fees. Rieck (2010) considers a variation of Taylor's framework which enables him to study the role of information revelation. Depending on the parameters the principal may be better off with or without information revelation.
Recently, a number of papers have used bandit models to study the problem of incentive provision for dynamic research activity. In bandit models it is unclear ex ante if the innovation in question can actually be successfully realized, so in contrast to our setting, these models focus on learning over time. Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2017) consider the optimal design of contests for innovation where the principal chooses the prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy which determines what information is revealed to the agents about their respective outcomes. Similarly to our setting, the first-best features a global stopping equilibrium. However, they find that a contest which does not entail a global stopping equilibrium can be optimal in the presence of learning. In particular, in a broad class of contests it is optimal to stop the contest only once a certain number of agents had a success and to share the prize between them. 19 Along similar lines Green and Taylor (2016) consider the role of breakthroughs in a single-agent contracting environment. In contrast to our framework, the research outcome can be contracted upon and the problem the principal faces is how to optimally induce effort over time using a first deadline for the breakthrough, a second deadline for the final outcome and a monetary transfer. In their paper the monetary transfer is decreasing over time, which induces the agent to aim for an early success. Thus, the slope of the prize schedule is used to affect the agent's incentives. In contrast, in our paper, the final prize aligns the agents' incentives, while the interim prizes serve to align the principal's incentives.
Related is also the literature on optimal design of research contests in the static setting, where the seminal contribution is Che and Gale (2003) . They show that with symmetric agents, the optimal contest is a scoring auction and the optimal number of agents is two. When agents are asymmetric, the optimal contest is still an auction with two agents, but the optimal auction handicaps the more efficient agents. 20 The innovation in their setting is deterministic, so there is no sampling benefit from having more than two agents. 21 Several other directions have been explored in the static setting. Letina and Schmutzler (2017) consider the optimal contest design when the agents can choose their approach to innovation and the principal attempts to give them incentives to diversify their approaches because of the resulting option value. They find that the optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where a winner gets a fixed prize, plus a bonus if he outperforms the second best agent with a high enough margin. Olszewski and Siegel (2018) provide a novel approach to optimal contest design with many agents. In a very general setting, they characterize the optimal prize structure and find that with convex costs and risk averse agents multiple prizes are optimal. Lang, Seel, and Strack (2014) is related to our result about the optimal contest length T . They consider a two-player FPC where agents exert effort over time and breakthroughs arrive according to a Poisson process. The agent with the most breakthroughs wins. They find that the principal can be better off with a shorter deadline. Seel (2018) characterizes the optimal deadline in a two-player FPC where the player with highest effort wins. He finds that a short deadline is optimal. In our paper, if the principal was limited to a FPC, shorter deadlines would also be optimal. However, since an IPC is stopped as soon as the threshold is reached, infinite deadlines are optimal. Related to our implementation result is Kruse and Strack (2015) . They study a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the agent observes realizations of a stochastic process over time. They show that for any threshold value, the principal can induce the agent to stop the game as soon as the process is above the threshold by committing to an appropriate schedule of transfers which depend only on the period when the game is stopped. In our paper, the stochastic process comes from the research done by the agents and the goal of the contest is to incentivize the agents to engage in research.
There is a growing empirical literature on dynamic research contests. 22 Using data on software contests Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011) find that increasing the number of participants reduces average effort but increases the chance of getting a very high quality innovation. Also using data on software contests Boudreau, Lakhani, and Menietti (2016) find that the results derived in Moldovanu and Sela (2001) generally perform quite well. In particular, they find that the response of participants to an increase in the number of competitors yields heterogeneous responses. Namely, low ability agents respond weakly, medium ability agents decrease their efforts while high ability agents increase their efforts. Bhattacharya (2018) estimates a multistage research contest based on the U.S. Department of Defense SBIR program. Lemus and Marshall (2018) estimate a dynamic contest model using data from Kaggle.com. 23 Using their model, they can evaluate counterfactual contest designs. One of their main findings is that having a public leaderboard during the contest improves the outcomes.
Conclusion
The goal of the present paper is to increase our understanding of the optimal design of research contests, which have recently seen a rapid expansion in practice. It turns out that including the possibility of paying out an interim prize improves contest design dramatically. Indeed we show that an interim-prize contest constitutes the optimal mechanism and allows the principal to implement the first best if she can freely choose the deadline of the contest. Our results show that even when the deadline is exogenously given, an interim-prize contest can implement the first best under the assumption of breakthrough innovations.
As was already mentioned, instead of the interim prize m, the optimum can be implemented if the principal commits to paying a fixed sum m/n to all agents in each period the contest is ongoing. This could be used to make sure that agents have sufficient funds to continue in the contests and to avoid distortions in the competitive balance (as in Möller, 2012) . Furthermore, such a contest format can be used to model promotion tournaments within firms. In a promotion tournament, firms commit to paying a salary (i.e. an interim award) to a group of workers, until one worker is promoted (which is the final prize). Our model suggests that the payment of salaries and the timing of the promotion are linked. Of course, in a promotion tournament the firm may be interested in the total effort provided by all workers or in selecting the best worker among the contestants. Furthermore, if inspecting submissions by the agents is not overly costly, the interim prize could be awarded to the agent with the current highest value of innovation (i.e. the current leader). Extending the model in these directions is an interesting avenue for future research.
In a similar vein, an alternative contest which does not entail interim prizes but instead features a dynamic prize schedule does almost as well as the interim-prize contest. In this alternative contest, the principal commits to a sequence of prizes p 1 , ..., p T . If the principal ends the contest in period t, the prize p t has to be paid out. The difference between two prizes p t and p t+1 plays a similar role to our interim prize. This alternative contest with a dynamic prize schedule can also implement global stopping equilibria, but only with finite deadlines. Thus, the first-best outcome can be approximated arbitrarily well, but not fully achieved.
We believe that our results have important implications for the design of research contests as they promise a substantial improvement over the standard fixed-prize contest. As noted in the introduction, an interim-prize contest allows us to combine the best aspects of two commonly employed contest formats, fixed-prize contest and innovation races. In addition, interim-prize contests should be easy to implement in most situations.
Appendices
Appendix A describes the game induced by an interim-prize contest. Appendix B contains all the proofs. Appendix C contains an example where increasing the deadline in a fixedprize contest decreases principal's payoff.
A The Game
The contest Γ = E, p, m, n, T induces the following extensive form game of incomplete information: G = I, H, α, F, (I i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I . The set of players is I = {0, 1, . . . , n}, where player 0 is the principal and players 1 to n are the agents. The set H is the set of histories, where the set of terminal histories is denoted Z and the actions available after the non-terminal history h is denoted A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}. The function α assigns to each non-terminal history a subset of I, i.e., α is the player function. The set of initial histories is the set of the states of the world. The true initial history is
. . , n} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T }) is drawn i.i.d. from the probability distribution F . An agent i who conducts research in period t receives value equal to θ it . For each player i ∈ I a partition I i of {h ∈ H : α(h) = i} (the information partition) with the property that A(h) = A(h ), whenever h and h are in the same member of the partition. The function u i : Z → R maps for each player i the payoff at each of the terminal nodes. For the agents the payoffs are determined by the research costs they have incurred, the entry fee they pay if they enter the contest, and the transfers they receive. The principal's payoff is determined by the value of the innovation she gets, the entry fees of the participants, and the transfers she makes to the agents. In what follows we will use the terms doing research and investing (in research) interchangeably. The timing of the game is as follows. Period 0:
-The principal announces the contest Γ = E, p, m, n, T .
-Agents decide whether to enter or not. All agents who enter the contest pay the entry fee E.
Period t < T :
-Stage 1: Each agent simultaneously decides whether to perform research at cost C. Agents do not observe the actions taken by their competitors.
-Stage 2: Each agent i who conducted research receives value equal to θ it . All other agents receive value 0.
-Stage 3: Having privately observed the value of their innovation, agents simultaneously decide whether to privately submit their innovation.
-Stage 4: The principal observes the set of submissions (if any) and decides whether to declare a winner. If a winner is declared the contest stops, the principal obtains the highest available innovation and the agent who submitted the winning innovation receives the prize p. If more than one agent provides innovation of the winning quality, the winner is chosen randomly. If the contest continues the principal pays the interim prize m to a randomly selected agent.
Period T (if T < ∞):
-Stages 1-3: As above.
-Stage 4: The contest stops and the principal has to declare a winner and pay the prize p to the winner.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote with σ i the strategy function of player i and with µ i the beliefs of player i after each history. Let (σ, µ) be the vector of strategies and beliefs of all players. The proof proceeds as follows. First, we present the equilibrium candidate (σ, µ) for the game described in the Appendix A. Then, three lemmas show that no profitable one-shot deviation exists after any history of the game. Second, we prove that no one-shot deviation implies that no profitable deviation exists, which is not obvious since the game could be infinite, and not continuous at infinity. To simplify notation, we suppress µ in all expressions.
Equilibrium Candidate
Denote with θ i |h the highest value available to player i at history h. For agents, this is the highest value they have so far discovered. For the principal, this is the highest value currently submitted. The equilibrium candidate (σ, µ) is defined as follows:
Agents If A(h) = {Invest, Not Invest} = {I, N I} then
If A(h) = {Submit, Not Submit} = {S, N S} then
Equilibrium beliefs of agent i are as follows. Denote a history in period t as h t . Let the last period when the agent i has not observed a deviation by the principal be t e |h t . This means that in period t e , agent i did not submit and that in all periods t e + 1, . . . , t − 1 the agent i submitted a value over θ g but the principal did not end the contest. Function µ i jt (·|h t ) specifies the beliefs of agent i regarding the element jt (of the state of the world) after some history h t . It is given by the following cases.
• Own elements of the state of the world (i = j):
• Others' elements of the state of the world (i = j):
if t ≤ t e |h t and θ k < θ g 0 if t ≤ t e |h t and θ k ≥ θ g
For own elements, the agent learns the exact state if he invests. If he does not invest, or if the chance to invest has not occurred yet, he holds initial beliefs. For the others' elements, once a period starts after no deviation from the principal, the agent concludes that everybody has invested up to that point and that nobody has a value higher than θ g . This implies that each individual θ jt is drawn from the truncated distribution. If the agent observes that the principal deviated, he learns nothing about the realization of the state in that period, hence he should hold the initial beliefs. For all the states which have not been revealed yet, the agent holds initial beliefs.
Principal Consider any information set at which the principal is moving. The principal stops the game if and only if there has been a submission of value at least θ g . Interim prize m is always allocated randomly. Final prize p is allocated to the agent with the highest submitted value, and ties are broken randomly. For any agent who has not submitted an innovation, the principal believes that research has been conducted in every period, yet the draws were always below θ g . For a firm which submitted an innovation, the principal believes that research has been conducted in every period and that the submission is the currently highest value.
Proof
Lemma 2 There exists no profitable one-shot deviation for the principal.
Proof. First, observe that the principal cannot profitably deviate when allocating the prize. Thus, we only need to consider deviations in instances when the principal chooses whether to stop or continue the contest. If T < ∞ there is a final period. In this final period the principal has to declare some agent the winner and pay the prize p. Thus, consider any period t < T . Suppose an innovation of value θ k ≥ θ g has been submitted to the principal. Stopping yields θ k − p, whereas continuing yields −m + δ(∆(θ k , n) − p). Thus, stopping is optimal whenever
Recall that m = p(1 − δ) + δ∆(θ g , n) − θ g . Simple algebra shows that ∆(θ, n) − θ is strictly decreasing in θ. Thus, the principal will stop the contest if a value θ k ≥ θ g has been submitted. Suppose now a value θ k < θ g has been submitted. We will show in three steps that stopping is not optimal.
Step 1. Denote with V t (σ|θ k ) the value to the principal of having the highest value θ k in period t given that she follows the equilibrium candidate. Then, it follows that V t (σ|θ g ) = θ g − p. In this step, we will show that also
for any t. It suffices to show that
Obviously, for any θ j ≥ θ g it holds V t+1 (σ|θ j ) = θ j − p. Substituting and rearranging we obtain m = p(1 − δ) + δ∆(θ g , n) − θ g which holds by definition for any t.
Step 2. In this step we show that for any pair θ k , θ k+1 such that θ k+1 ≤ θ g it holds that
We have
and an equivalent expression holds for V t (σ|θ k+1 ).
Step 3. In this step we show that for any θ k < θ g , the principal does not stop the contest, i.e., there is no profitable one-shot deviation. Stopping the contest in period t yields the payoff of θ k − p. Thus, it suffices to show that V t (σ|θ k ) > θ k − p for any θ k < θ g . Observe that V t (σ|θ g ) − θ g + p = 0. We will show that V t (σ|θ k ) − θ k is strictly decreasing in θ k for any θ k < θ g . The result then follows. This is equivalent to
Then, we have V T (σ|θ k+1 )−V T (σ|θ k ) = θ k+1 −θ k because the contest ends in that period. Iterating Step 2 it follows that
and thus a one-shot deviation is not profitable.
Suppose T = ∞. Then we have V t (σ|θ k ) = V (σ|θ k ) for all t and all θ k . Moreover, for any θ k < θ g we have V (σ|θ k ) = V (σ|θ k+1 ). Further,
We will now show that the principal will not want to deviate with value θ g−1 , that is, we show that V (σ|θ g−1 ) > θ g−1 − p. Rewriting this inequality and replacing m we obtain
Collecting terms and further simplifying we obtain
which always holds. Thus, whenever the principal has obtained a value of θ g−1 she will not stop the contest. Further, for any θ k , θ k+1 < θ g we have
implying that she will also not stop it for any other θ k < θ g .
Lemma 3
There is no profitable one-shot deviation at the submission stage for the agent.
Proof. Observe that submitting an innovation that has value below θ g is never profitable.
Thus we only need to consider the decision of an agent who has an innovation of value θ k ≥ θ g . Suppose the state of the world is such that another agent has a value θ ≥ θ k . Then, submitting yields a weakly higher payoff, as it could mean the agent wins the prize, whereas not submitting yields zero as the contest ends for sure. Finally, suppose the state of the world is such that no other agent has a value θ ≥ θ k .
We need to consider two cases: when θ k = θ K and when θ k < θ K . Suppose first that θ k = θ K . The payoff of following the equilibrium strategy and submitting is p. One-shot deviation is to not submit, then not do research, and then submit. The payoff of this deviation is m n + δP t+1 (σ |θ K , t)p
where P t+1 (σ |θ K , t) is the probability that the agent wins the contest in period t + 1 given that he has the quality θ K in period t and follows the deviation strategy σ . The deviation will not be profitable if p ≥ m n + δP t+1 (σ |θ K , t)p.
Since m = (1 − δ)p + δ∆(θ g , n) − θ g and P t+1 (σ |θ K , t) < 1, for all p large enough it holds
Observe that
(1 − δ)p n + δp = (1 + (n − 1)δ) p n ≤ (1 + (n − 1)) p n ≤ p so that for p large enough the deviation will not be profitable.
In the case θ k < θ K the one-shot deviation is to not submit, invest, and then submit. However, observe that the quality in the next period cannot be greater than θ K , which implies that the deviation payoff is less than m/n + δ(P t+1 (σ|θ K , t + 1)p − C). As this is less than in the previous case, this deviation is also not profitable.
Lemma 4 There exists no profitable one-shot deviation at the research stage for the agent.
Proof. Suppose that the highest quality agent i has in period t is θ k . In what follows, we show that for a sufficiently high p investing is optimal for all θ k < θ K and it is not optimal for θ k = θ K . Let σ be a strategy profile that coincides with the equilibrium candidate σ with the exception of the agent i's action in the investment stage in period t. Thus, it is a one-shot deviation. First note that a deviation in the case θ k = θ K would imply investing when the agent has the highest feasible quality. This is trivially never optimal, as the agent incurs research costs without an increase in quality. Thus, focus on the case θ k < θ K where a deviation is to not invest.
Denote the expected utility of agent i following the strategy σ from period t in which his highest quality is θ k with U i (σ|θ k , t). A one-shot deviation is not profitable if
As before, let P s (σ|θ k , t) be the probability that the agent i wins the contest in period s ≥ t, again following the strategy σ from period t in which the highest quality was θ k . In period t, when the deviation takes place, we have
as the investment strictly increases the probability of winning. Further, for all t < s < T (i.e., any subsequent period after the deviation except the last one) we have P s (σ|θ k , t) = P s (σ |θ k , t), and in the final period (if there is any) we have
Now consider the case θ g ≤ θ k < θ K . In this case, the game will end with certainty in period t and the LHS of inequality (6) reads
Thus, for a sufficiently high p, not investing is not a profitable deviation.
The only remaining case is θ k < θ g , which we now consider. Observe that we can write the expected utilities of the strategies σ and σ in the following way
T s=t+1 P s (σ |θ k , t)p + m nδ (δF n (θ g−1 )) s−t−1 − K where K and K collect all cost terms. Furthermore, note that m = (1−δ)p+δ∆(θ g , n)−θ g , so if we redefine K and K to contain all terms not containing p we can write
Then, for sufficiently high p, the inequality 6 will be satisfied if
Simplifying and collecting terms
Since P s (σ|θ k , t) ≥ P s (σ |θ k , t) for all s, a sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is
) as the probability of winning certainly includes all states of the world where the agent i obtains the quality above θ g−1 while no one else does. Thus, a sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is
which we can rewrite as
Observe that P s (σ |θ k , t) = (1 − F n (θ g−1 ))/n since 1 − F n (θ g−1 ) is the probability that the contest ends and by symmetry the agents have equal chances of winning it. Furthermore, P T (σ |θ k , t) < 1. Hence, a sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is
which holds for T finite since both 1/n and (1 + (n − 1)δ)/n are smaller than one, and the RHS equals 1/n for infinite T . We conclude the proof by showing that since no one-shot deviation exists, then no profitable deviation exists at all. First, observe that if T is finite, then the result follows by Theorem 1 of Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996) . If T is infinite and δ < 1, then the game is continuous at infinity and the result follows by Corollary 2 of Hendon et al. (1996) . The only remaining case is T infinite and δ = 1. Our proof is an adaptation of the standard argument (e.g. the proof of Corollary 2 in Hendon et al. (1996) and the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ). As before, denote with (σ, µ) the candidate equilibrium. From Lemmas 2-4 we know that no profitable OSD exists. Suppose that some other profitable deviation exists. We consider deviations by agents and by the principal separately.
First we consider deviations by agents. Then, there exists an agent i, a history h t and a strategyσ i such that
Consider an alternative strategy of agent i,σ î t , whereσ î t (h t ) =σ i (h t ) for all t ≤t and σ î t (h t ) = σ i (h t ) for all t >t. That is, the strategyσ î t agrees with the deviation strategỹ σ i in the firstt rounds of the contest, while it agrees with the equilibrium candidate afterwards. Observe that, regardless of the strategy employed by agent i, the probability that the contest is still active after additional t periods is at most (F n−1 (θ g−1 )) t−1 < 1. Thus, there existst large enough, such that
However, sinceσ î t and σ i differ only after a finite number of histories, this would imply by Theorem 1 of Hendon et al. (1996) that σ i admits a profitable one-shot deviation. A contradiction.
Second, suppose that there exists a history h t and a deviation strategy for the principalσ 0 such that U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ) > U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ). Letσ 0 be an alternative strategy where after any history in which quality θ K has been submitted, the principal stops the contest. After all other histories the strategiesσ 0 andσ 0 coincide. Since stopping the contest is the dominant strategy after θ K has been submitted, then U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ) ≥ U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ) for all h t and in particular U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ) > U 0 (σ 0 , σ −0 |h t ). However, observe that when following the strategy (σ 0 , σ −0 ) the probability that the contest is still active after additional t periods is at most (F n (θ K )) t−1 < 1. But then, using the same argument as above, we can construct a strategy which outperforms σ 0 but only differs from it after a finite number of histories, reaching a contradiction again.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The first-best problem corresponds to the optimal search problem in Benkert et al. (2018) . By Proposition 1 of Benkert et al. (2018) the first-best is to draw n F B observations in each period until the value of at least θ F B has been discovered. By Proposition 1, we know that there exists an IPC which can implement the global stopping threshold θ g N with n F B N and T = ∞, thus generating the first-best surplus. Then, by setting E appropriately, the principal can extract the entire expected surplus and achieve the first-best outcome.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
It is straightforward that for any quality level θ j ≥ θ b the principal will stop doing research because θ K − θ b < C and thus the cost of doing more research strictly outweighs the potential benefit. Thus, whenever the principal continues searching, she has a current highest quality of innovation of 0. Hence, the problem is as if the principal had no recall. Proposition 3 in Gal et al. (1981) , which can be adapted to the current setting with discounting and a discrete set of innovation levels, then implies that the principal will want to employ an increasing number of agents as the deadline draws nearer.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The game induced by a gIPC and the equilibrium candidate are analogous to those described above. The proof proceed in the similar fashion. We first show that no profitable one-shot deviation exists. Next, since the game is finite, Theorem 1 of Hendon et al. (1996) implies that no profitable deviation exists at all.
Lemma 5 There exists no profitable one-shot deviation for the principal.
Proof. First, observe that the principal cannot profitably deviate when allocating the prize. Thus, we only need to consider deviations in instances when the principal chooses whether to stop or continue the contest. Since T < ∞ there is a final period. In this final period the principal has to declare some agent the winner and pay the prize p. Thus we only need to consider deviations in periods t < T . Suppose an innovation of value θ k ≥ θ b has been submitted to the principal. Stopping yields θ k − p, whereas continuing yields −m t + δ(∆(θ k , n t+1 ) − p + E t+1 ), where E t+1 = (n t+1 − n t )E t+1 is the sum of entry fees received by the principal in period t + 1. Thus, stopping is optimal whenever
Recall that m t = p(1 − δ) + δ(∆(θ b , n t+1 ) + E t+1 ) − θ g . Since ∆(θ, n t+1 ) − θ is strictly decreasing in θ, the principal will stop the contest whenever a value θ k ≥ θ b has been submitted.
Suppose now a value θ k < θ b has been submitted. Assumption 1 then implies θ k = 0. The payoff of stopping is −p, and continuing (since it constitutes a first best) always has a positive payoff. Hence, stopping is never optimal.
Lemma 6 There is exists no profitable one-shot deviation at the submission stage for the agent.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7 There exists no profitable one-shot deviation at the research stage for the agent.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 8 There exists no profitable one-shot deviation at for agents who have not yet entered the contest.
Proof. Whenever agents are invited to join the contest, they are chosen randomly from the set N . Thus, each agent has a probability 0 of being invited to the contest and therefore no incentive to conduct any research before being invited to participate.
Finally, since T is finite and no profitable one-shot deviation exist, Theorem 1 of Hendon et al. (1996) implies that no profitable deviation exists at all.
C Example: extending T can lower surplus in an FPC
To construct an example of a harmful extension of T in case of an FPC we consider a setting with δ = 1, N = 2, Θ = {0, 1} and extend T = 2 to T + 1 = 3. Let the probability of drawing θ 1 = 1 be given by π. We will choose parameters such that the optimal individual threshold is θ i = 1. The expected costs in the case of T = 2 are given by EK(2, 2) = 2(πC + 2(1 − π)C) and the expected quality EQ(2, 2) = 1 − (1 − π) 4 . In the case of T = 3 we have EK(2, 3) = 2(πC + 2(1 − π)πC + 3(1 − π) 2 C) and the expected quality EQ(2, 3) = 1 − (1 − π) 6 .
Hence, the change in expected surplus for the principal is given by EQ(2, 2) − EK(2, 2) − EQ(2, 3) + EK(2, 3) = (1 − π) 2 2C − (2 − π)π(1 − π) 2 which is negative for C = 1/10 and π = 2/5. Since EQ(2, 2) − EK(2, 2) = 16 25 − 8 25 > 0 the individual threshold is θ i = 1 is indeed optimal.
